Our Clarifying Moment: A Global Call To Action
Strengthen and Mobilize Multilateral Institutions
United Nations
After Russia vetoed a resolution deploring its aggression against Ukraine on February 25, 2022, the Security Council voted to call for a rare emergency special session of the 193-member United Nations (UN) General Assembly. At such point, only 10 such emergency special sessions of the General Assembly had been convened since 1950, following the adoption of Resolution 377A(V), widely known as “Uniting for Peace Resolution.” In the ensuing emergency session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Russia and calling on it to cease hostilities and withdraw its military forces from Ukraine, demonstrating remarkable unity within the international community.
During its 11th emergency special session at the end of March 2022, the General Assembly adopted a resolution urging civilian protection and humanitarian access in Ukraine. In April 2022, it voted to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council. In addition, the UN appointed three human rights experts to investigate potential violations of international humanitarian law. In May 2022, the Security Council issued its first unanimous statement on the conflict, expressing “deep concern regarding the maintenance of peace and security in Ukraine.” On October 12, 2022, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly passed a resolution condemning Russia’s “attempted illegal annexation” and calling on states to refrain from recognizing the four Ukrainian regions—Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia—where Russia held sham referenda. In February 2023, the General Assembly adopted a new resolution calling for the end of the war and Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine. Ukraine did not end up pursuing a General Assembly resolution around the two-year anniversary of the conflict due to concerns over decreasing support from Arab states given alleged double standards around the conflict in Israel-Palestine. Since February 2023, the UN has not since passed any additional General Assembly resolutions or issued any additional unanimous Security Council statements.
In addition to condemning Russian actions in Ukraine, the UN sought to address the global implications of the conflict. In July 2022, the UN launched the Black Sea Grain Initiative to facilitate the resumption of Ukrainian grain and Russian food and fertilizer exports via the Black Sea to mitigate the worldwide food insecurity crisis. The UN also created a Joint Coordination Center to monitor implementation of the deal and use of the maritime humanitarian corridor, which includes representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey. Russia suspended its participation in the deal at the end of October 2022 after it accused Ukraine of carrying out “massive air and sea strikes using drones” on its naval fleet. The mandate was ultimately extended three more times, but Russia terminated its engagement in July 2023. At the time of its termination, the deal had allowed the export of almost 33 million tons of grain and other foodstuffs. Fortunately, by the end of 2023 and early 2024, Ukrainian exports have been able to follow a new shipping route in the Black Sea through which 4.8 million tons of foodstuffs flow per month—higher than the rate under the Black Sea Grain Initiative—mainly due to Ukraine’s use of drones against Russian ships and recapturing of territory by the Danube delta. Still, Russia continues to undermine efforts to ship foodstuffs from Ukraine, including through attempted drone attacks on the port city of Odesa in January 2024.
The UN has continued to call attention to the devastating impacts of the conflict in Ukraine, including sexual violence by Russian troops, human trafficking risks for women and children, the targeting of civilian infrastructure, the deaths of “countless Ukrainian civilians,” the Kakhovka Dam collapse, and threats of Russian nuclear aggression. In March 2023, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs stated that “the risk of a nuclear weapon being used is currently higher than at any time since the depths of the Cold War,” particularly given the decisions by Russian President Vladimir Putin to place nuclear weapons inside Belarusian territory and to suspend Russia’s participation in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). During a December 2023 UN Security Council meeting, numerous country representatives voiced concern over Moscow’s threat of nuclear weapons use.
In September 2022, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine on Ukraine confirmed the commission of war crimes by Russian forces, The Commission, in conjunction with the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), released a report in March 2023, which documents evidence of alleged war crimes, including attacks on civilians and energy-related infrastructure, wilful killings, unlawful confinement, torture, rape and other sexual violence, as well as unlawful transfers and deportations of children. The Commission submitted another report to the General Assembly in October 2023 that confirmed additional evidence that Russian authorities have committed violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law, and corresponding crimes, in areas that came under their control in Ukraine. A May 2023 report by OHCHR highlighted the disproportionate effect the conflict has had on older populations in Ukraine. Although people over the age of 60 are only 25% of the population, they comprised 32% of civilians killed in the first year of the war. In June 2023, the UN placed Russia on its annual blacklist of countries that violate the rights of children due to the killing of children and intentional targeting of hospitals and schools. As of February 2024, the conflict in Ukraine has left more than 7,000 schools in Ukraine inaccessible and led to learning losses for 5.3 million Ukrainian children.
Immediate actions needed:
The UN must continue to take sustained action as long as Russian aggression persists and reject future veto attempts by Russia on UN action, pursuant to Art. 27(3) of the UN Charter, which requires parties to a dispute to abstain from voting.
The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry must continue to meticulously investigate and document alleged human rights abuses by Russia. The UN and other donors must continue to robustly fund and support the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to gather evidence and document human rights abuses and violations of international law to support future prosecutions and reparations claims
UN members must also support peacebuilding and conflict prevention programming globally through a strengthened UN Peacebuilding Commission and Support Office, increased contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund, and better-equipped conflict resolution programs in the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the World Bank.
The UN must ensure that other ongoing crises, such as in Israel-Palestine and Sudan, do not reduce attention and resources for the crisis in Ukraine, but rather re-emphasize the need for assistance that prioritizes protection and prevention of further violence and atrocities around the world.
In the future, the UN must not shy away from calling emergency sessions of the General Assembly for conflicts. The UN must use the “Uniting for Peace” General Assembly power to take up matters of international peace and security so no country can veto UN actions, as opposed to the Security Council, which is often unable to act because of the lack of unanimity among its five veto-wielding permanent members.
The European Union
The European Union (EU) has taken significant action to condemn and respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As of February 2024, the EU has adopted 13 sanctions packages targeting Russia. All together, these packages sanctioned more than 2,100 individuals and entities and froze more than $23 billion of assets in the EU. The sanctions have imposed strict restrictions on imports and exports, as well as on Russian state-owned enterprises and its financial, technology, and other sectors, and removed 10 Russian and four Belarusian banks from the SWIFT banking system. The EU has also shut down EU airspace for Russian aircraft and banned numerous Russian state-owned media outlets. The EU has also banned Russian coal imports, banned seaborne oil from Russia, and set price caps for Russian petroleum products. These efforts have greatly reduced the EU’s reliance on Russian energy imports, decreasing its dependence on Russian gas from 45% in 2021 to 15% in 2023.
EU sanctions over the conflict are expanding beyond Russia; the 10th sanctions package included seven Iranian entities that manufactured drones used by Russia. The 11th round is focused on restricting trade that supports the Russian war efforts, including through third-party countries that trade with both the EU and Russia and for materials that assist the Russian security sector. The 12th package added 29 Russian and third-country entities associated with Russia’s war effort, including in Uzbekistan and Singapore. The 13th package targeted an additional 140 companies and individuals involved in Russia’s military; 10 Russian companies and individuals involved in the shipping of North Korean arms to Russia; six Russian judges and 10 Russian officials in the occupied territory of Ukraine; and almost 20 individuals and entities involved in the forced transfer, deportation, and military indoctrination of Ukrainian children, including in Belarus. Despite the speed and breadth of the European sanctions regime, a lack of unanimity persists, providing loopholes for specific sectors. For instance, Austria, Slovakia, Italy, and Croatia continue to receive Russian gas via long-term contracts with Russian company Gazprom. Additionally, the EU’s imports of Russian nuclear fuel and services increased in 2023 compared to 2021.
On June 23, 2022, the EU granted candidate status to Ukraine and set out seven conditions that Ukraine must complete before accession. In December 2023, the EU agreed to begin accession talks with Ukraine, which could still take a decade or longer. The bloc has also worked to mitigate the challenges of winter and losses in energy infrastructure through the Ukraine Energy Support Fund. Thus far, the EU has pledged to provide more than $150 billion in total assistance to Ukraine, but has actually allocated only $83 billion.
In March 2022, the EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive to provide visa-free entry and equitable assistance, asylum, and the right to employment to all refugees fleeing the conflict in Ukraine. In the fall of 2023, the EU extended the Directive until March 2025. By the end of 2023, more than 4.3 million people lived under the Directive in the EU. However, a December 2023 report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights noted challenges in the Directive’s implementation around provision of education, housing, employment, and healthcare due to overburdened local authorities and scarce resources. The EU must take further coordinated action to mitigate the humanitarian impact of the conflict and work toward a nonviolent solution.
Immediate actions needed:
Utilize all diplomatic and economic tools to ensure member agreement to urgently phase out imports of Russian oil, natural gas, and uranium while maintaining energy security and protecting civilians from rising energy costs, including providing resources and assistance for countries particularly reliant on Russian fossil fuels. The EU must work to promote energy independence and security, particularly from Russian oil that arrives via pipeline.
Use this situation, which highlights the interconnected and compounding nature of climate change and conflict, to accelerate planned transitions to renewable and climate-neutral energy to prevent a repeat situation that benefits bad actors in fossil fuel-rich states.
Close outstanding loopholes related to Russian imports and expand the current EU sanctions regime to include special interest sectors currently omitted, as well as any countries and companies that are supplying arms to Russia for the conflict in Ukraine.
Scale the humanitarian assistance for conflict-affected civilians from Ukraine, and in-kind assistance and emergency operations to expedite the delivery of material assistance via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.
Prepare and identify funds and programs for long-term humanitarian and development support to Ukraine and the region, including conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
Ensure sustained implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive by EU member states to assist refugees fleeing the conflict in Ukraine beyond the rights and aid provided under the Directive. The EU must continue to disseminate guidelines and increase the capacity of EU member states to receive, process, and support refugees fleeing Ukraine and address these challenges. Following the challenges observed in the EU’s December 2023 report on implementing the Directive, the EU must work with local governments to increase public accommodation capacity that considers the unique needs of women, children, and the elderly; bolstering school capacity for displaced students and ensuring coordination between national and local authorities when enrolling displaced children in schools; reducing burdensome procedures in order for displaced individuals to have their professional qualifications recognized; and reducing healthcare burdens and insufficient or delayed insurance coverage for displaced under the Directive.
Continue to provide emergency and long-term support through the Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE) and ensure EU member states have the requisite funds and flexibility to address the needs of refugees fleeing the conflict in Ukraine.
Create a regional coordinator to work in tandem with UN counterparts—including the UN Regional Refugee Coordinator for the Ukraine Situation—and oversee the protection and assistance of Ukrainian refugees throughout EU member states and utilization of the Solidarity Platform, created in May 2022, to help facilitate information-sharing between members.
State parties to the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings must uphold their commitments to prevent and combat human trafficking and implement the Common Anti-Trafficking Plan to protect Ukrainian refugees. Reports abound of Ukrainian refugees facing human trafficking as they flee the conflict, who are being subjected to cruel labor and sexual exploitation. Countries accepting refugees must immediately bolster coordination and border crossings and reception facilities to ensure accurate refugee registration, as well as access to documentation and psychosocial, gender-sensitive, and trauma-informed support. They must also work to inform refugees of the risk of and prevent fraudulent offers of housing, transportation, and work and take urgent measures to protect women and unaccompanied children, who are at heightened risk.
Continue to support the amended mandate of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) to assist Ukraine with the investigation and prosecution of international crimes perpetrated during the conflict and promote civilian security.
Provide substantial resources and financial support to the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation and the International Center for the Prosecution of Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine to investigate crimes in Ukraine and facilitate cooperation between EU members and the International Criminal Court, and support non-governmental organizations documenting atrocities and providing assistance to survivors and other conflict-affected civilians.
Expedite the delivery of the dedicated €50 billion and provide sustained support to advance Ukraine’s reconstruction and EU accession through the Ukraine Facility for 2024 - 2027.
Integrate peacebuilding, conflict prevention, conflict sensitivity, gender sensitivity, and a trauma-informed approach across all EU assistance for Ukraine.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced that it will not send troops to Ukraine in response to the Russian invasion, the alliance is coordinating Ukrainian requests for assistance, supporting aid delivery, increasing munitions stockpiles, and enhancing the resiliency of energy and undersea infrastructure. It also deployed defensive forces to the eastern countries in the bloc and increased the number of ships in the Baltic and North Seas.
Following decades of neutrality, Finland joined NATO in April 2023. In February 2024, Hungary’s parliament voted to approve Sweden’s accession to NATO after being the last remaining holdout. The addition of Finland to NATO is significant, as the country will provide the alliance with a “well-trained military that is poised to defend its 832-mile border with Russia.” Similarly, Sweden brings highly capable armed forces in proximity to the Russian border, and its accession to NATO—a break from its traditionally neutral foreign policy—could be a positive signal for other undecided countries to back Ukraine. Ukraine formally submitted its application for membership in September 2022 after Russia annexed four Ukrainian provinces and held sham referenda therein. NATO has since agreed upon a new multi-year assistance program to facilitate the transition of Ukraine’s armed forces to NATO standards, rebuild their security sector and critical infrastructure, and winter and demining equipment, but declined to formally invite Ukraine to formally join the alliance. In November 2023, the NATO-Ukraine Council—which was launched at the July 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius as a joint body for Ukraine and NATO to advance political dialogue, engagement, and cooperation—met for the first time at the level of foreign ministers, after which the Council issued a statement reaffirming the multi-year program and announced NATO’s intentions to support Ukraine’s deterrence and defense in the long-term. The statement also mentioned NATO’s plans to develop “a roadmap for Ukraine’s transition to full interoperability with NATO.” NATO must now take additional action to ensure regional security. In February 2024, NATO announced it would establish a new NATO-Ukraine joint analysis, training, and education center, in which Ukrainian forces can share lessons learned from their war with Russia and train with allies.
Immediate actions needed:
Utilize the NATO-Ukraine Council to develop a coordinated approach to advance political dialogue, address Russian aggression in Ukraine, and facilitate Ukraine’s accession to NATO membership.
Develop policy tools and deterrence measures to protect NATO members along its eastern front in Europe and prevent Russia from escalating its aggression further in the region.
Ensure sustained assistance through the Comprehensive Assistance Package and trust funds to address current needs and long-term, post-conflict reconstruction and reform.
Leverage NATO expansion, especially with the additions of Finland and Sweden, as a diplomatic tool to modify Russia’s behavior and advance negotiations to end the conflict.
Urgently provide the resources dedicated during and since the July 2023 Vilnius Summit to continue to bring Ukraine closer to NATO, particularly humanitarian-focused resources such as demining assistance, fuel, and winter equipment, as well as reconstruction of critical infrastructure.
Coordinate a large-scale strategic communications campaign aimed at the civilians of NATO countries to clearly explain why it is in member states’ best interests to provide ongoing, substantial assistance to Ukraine and how it will promote peace and security.
International Courts
In March 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced that the Office was opening an investigation into the Situation in Ukraine, a positive development in efforts to ensure accountability over Russian aggression and alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. The referral of the case by 43 state parties to the Rome Statute expedited the investigation, the largest ever in ICC history, with numerous ICC teams deploying to Ukraine to interview witnesses and collect evidence. The EU’s EuroJust created a Joint Investigation Team for Ukraine (JIT), which consists of Ukraine, six EU members, and the ICC. This is the first time the ICC has joined a JIT to collect and share information, coordinate investigations, and hold perpetrators to account. Additionally, the International Centre for the Prosecution of Crimes of Aggression (ICPA), located in The Hague, officially began its work in July 2023, to coordinate with the ICC and JIT to investigate, collect data, interview victims, and preserve evidence of the crimes committed during the war.
In July 2022, 45 countries signed a compact to provide $20 million to support the ICC’s investigation and coordinate international efforts. In March 2023, an international conference raised an additional $4.9 million to support the ICC’s work. That month, the ICC issued arrest warrants for President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova for the war crimes of unlawful deportation of children and unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. Ukraine, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and others, however, are calling for the establishment of a special criminal tribunal to prosecute high-level Russian officials for the crime of aggression—for which the ICC lacks jurisdiction, as Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute—as well as other international crimes, though such a tribunal has not been established as of February 2024.
In March 2022, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) required Russia to immediately cease military operations in Ukraine. Russia’s refusal to appear before the ICJ does not absolve it from the Court’s jurisdiction or the ruling. The ICJ also affirmed that no evidence exists of acts of genocide by the Ukrainian government, which Russia used as a justification for its aggression. This finding serves as a powerful fact-check to Russian propaganda. The ICJ’s ruling further buttresses the European Court of Human Rights’ call for Russia to stop attacking civilians and civilian objects.
However, in February 2024, the ICJ ruled that the Court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether Russia’s uses of force against Ukraine were justified based on (even false) claims of genocide, shooting down a Ukrainian claim that the spread of disinformation gave rise to a dispute that should be litigated by the Court under the Genocide Convention. The ICJ also ruled that it has jurisdiction over Russian claims of alleged genocide committed by Ukraine against ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine—meaning that Ukraine’s conduct and not Russia’s will be investigated by the Court. Yet, further inquiry by the Court could serve to finally dispel Russia’s claim that Ukraine committed genocide on its own territory.
The UK, U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Germany, Sweden, Poland, and Lithuania, amongst others, have also launched investigations to support war crimes prosecutions domestically. In May 2022, the EU, US, and UK created the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine to support the investigations of Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General. In November 2023, the U.S. State Department announced it will provide $1 million to support the ICPA. Ukraine completed its first trial in mid-May 2022, sentencing a 21-year-old Russian soldier to life in prison, although the sentence was reduced to 15 years. As of February 2024, Ukrainian courts have convicted 80 Russian soldiers of war crimes, and are investigating 126,0000 alleged war crimes.
In a significant development for accountability amidst the conflict, in December 2023, the U.S. charged four Russian soldiers with war crimes against an American who was living in Ukraine during the February 2022 invasion—the first ever charges under the Justice for War Crimes Act of 2023 to prosecute war crimes against American citizens. These domestic proceedings have the opportunity to be more expedient and efficient, although the courts outside of Ukraine face the logistical barrier of jurisdiction over Russian forces. Regardless, they serve as a complementary accountability mechanism for international mechanisms as atrocities continue in real time.
Immediate actions needed:
The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor must continue to investigate the alleged crimes and provide support to the Ukrainian government, prosecutors, investigators, and civil society to collect and preserve evidence and coordinate with other investigative teams.
Individuals and organizations collecting evidence of potential crimes against humanity and war crimes should submit all findings to the Office of the Prosecutor through its dedicated portal or at otp.informationdesk@icc-cpi.int.
State parties to the ICC should immediately increase their contributions to the Court to ensure it has all the resources to comprehensively investigate the situation in Ukraine and all other cases currently under investigation.
The UN, as well as partners in the EU, should engage in a robust, open debate regarding the establishment of a special criminal tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression and ensure that any such mechanism created would complement the efforts and funding of the ICC, Ukrainian courts, and other national courts exercising universal jurisdiction.
The U.S. should scale up and adequately resource its efforts to prosecute Russian forces for war crimes against U.S. citizens via the war crimes statute. The U.S. should also increase its support for the ICPA to bolster the ICC’s and JIT’s efforts to investigate and achieve accountability for atrocities in Ukraine.
The European Court of Human Rights should extend its decision instructing Russia to “refrain from military attacks against civilians and civilian objects” as violations of not just international humanitarian law, but also international human rights law.
Domestic courts should undertake investigations, prosecute Russian perpetrators subject to their jurisdiction, share evidence, and coordinate with other international, regional, and national efforts to promote accountability.